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                                                              Abstract.   
The study examines the relationship between private and public investment in Zimbabwe 
utilizing yearly time series data for the period 1970 to 2007. Emphasis is placed on the direction 
of causality and the effect of the two types of investment on each other.  The paper constructs 
empirical models for both private and public investment, based on the flexible accelerator theory. 
Private investment is found to be cointegrated with public investment. A cointergration approach 
and VEC model are employed to assess the short run relationship existing between public and 
private investment. The relationship between private and public investment is found to be 
insignificant and the direction of causality found to be unidirectional. The results support the 
notion that private investment precedes public investment.   
 
 
Key words: Private Investment, Public Investment, Causality, Flexible Accelerator Theory, 
Zimbabwe.   
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Introduction 
The recent situation of the Zimbabwe economy can be consider as one of African economic 
disaster in which a country full of economic potential, severely undermine his prospective due to 
mismanagement and political instability, passing from one of the African  strongest economies to 
the world worst.  Between the period of 2000 to 2007, the national economy contracted by 40%, 
inflation domed to over 66,000%, agricultural output dropped by 51%, industrial production 
shrunk by 47% whilst foreign investment evaporated with the consequence of the drastic 
reduction of the output per capita of about 40%. The circumstances became distressed with the 
imposition of sanction by western nations.    
During this period, the shares of investment respect to GDP witness a reduction of about -80 %, 
from 25% of GDP of the 1990s to -15% of 2004, with disastrous consequences such as capital 
loss, which is one of the leading driving forces for the decline in investment in Zimbabwe. 
Capital loss associated with investment risk can arise from three causes: macroeconomic 
instability, loss of assets due to non-enforceability of contracts; and physical destruction of 
infrastructure caused by armed conflicts (Hernandez-Cata (2000), Easterly and Levine (1997). 
This paper seeks to analyses public and private investment behavior in Zimbabwe for the period 
spanning from 1970 to 2007, taking into account the effects of the IMF-supported economic 
structural adjustment program (ESAP), the 1998 crisis (when Zimbabwe’s real GDP started to 
decline) and to verify if private and public investment complement each other as assumed by 
various studies and to what extent. The basis of the study will be the assumption that private 
investment and public investment complement each other and also that public investment is 
essential for private investment to be possible.  
 Pervious empirical studies on  the effects and existing inter-linkages between aggregate private 
and public investment have generally followed two main approaches. The first approach is the 
use of national aggregates as explanatory variables for the topic under review. The second 
approach entails using individual firm and/or industry-specific explanatory variables to explain 
investment behavior. Most of these studies have used time series analysis with a few opting for 
panel data analysis. The flexible accelerator model has been the most popular among the models 
used to estimate investment behavior. The accelerator model was propounded by Clark (1917). 
However, it has been less preferred as a model because of its stringent assumptions and an 
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adjustment coefficient of investment equal to unity. The accelerator model with an adjustment 
coefficient equal to unity was rejected in tests by Kuznets, Tinbergen, Chenery, Koyck and 
Hickman (Jorgenson, 1971).The flexible accelerator model is used as an alternative in most 
investment studies.  
The literature on the impact of public investment on private investment in developing economies 
gives inconsistent results on whether it complements or crowds out private investment. Applying 
several pooled specifications of a standard investment model to a panel of developing economies 
for 1980 to 1997, Erden and Holcombe (2005) find that public investment complements private 
investment. . they also run the same empirical models on a panel of developed economie, public 
investment crowds out private investment in developed economies. The results show that in a 
number of important ways, private investment in developed economies is influenced by different 
factors than private investment in developing economies. Ahmad and Qayyum (2008) make 
mention of Aschauer(1989), Greene and Villanuva(1991), Munnell (1992), Shafik (1992), 
Oshikaya (1994), Ramirez (1994), Ghura and Goodwin (2000), Mamatzakis (2001) and Rashid 
(2005) as having investigated and found a positive relationship between the two types of 
investment  
Pereira (2001) tests the effects of public investment on the evolution of private investment in the 
United States. Use of an impulse response analysis associated with vector auto-regressive (VAR) 
estimates is made. The empirical results suggest that at the aggregate level, public investment 
crowds in private investment.  
It should be noted that the effect of public investment on private investment in Zimbabwe has 
had conflicting results as investigated by Jenkins (1998) and Ndovorwi (1997). Jenkins (1998) 
concludes that in the long run aggregate public investment has either an ambivalent role or plays 
no role at all in determining private investment expenditure. On the other hand, Ndovorwi (1997) 
concludes that public infrastructural investment is positively related to private investment in the 
long run.  
Ndovorwi investigates the impact of public policy on private capital formation in Zimbabwe. 
Private investment is regressed on public investment, bank credit to the private sector, inflation 
rate, output growth rate and lagged private investment. In the short run, Ndovorwi gives the 
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impression that public investment, whether infrastructural or non-infrastructural crowds out 
private investment. The extent to which infrastructural investment crowds out private investment 
is found to be very insignificant. It is worthwhile to note that Ndovorwi uses annual data for the 
years 1980 to 1990, which is decomposed into quarterly form using interpolation. Interpolation 
normally leads to a loss of degrees of freedom in the estimation process. The extent of the loss 
depends on the interpolation method employed. On the other hand, Jenkins (1998) makes use of 
annual data for the years 1969 to 1990 as she assesses the long run and short run determinants of 
private investment. Both Jenkins (1998) and Ndovorwi (1997) make use of error correction 
models to arrive at their results.    
In a nearly similar study to Ndovorwi’s for Turkey, Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992)1, found 
out that, with a three year lag, an increase in the share of infrastructure investment in public 
investment has a positive impact on private investment. Mataya and Veeman (1996) analysed the 
investment behaviour in Malawi’s private and public goods sectors between 1967 and 1988, 
taking into account partial liberalisation and contractionary fiscal and monetary policies 
associated with the IMF-supported ESAP. A Granger causality test is employed to assess 
whether one way causality or two way causality exists between private and public investment. A 
two-way causality is found to exist between the two types of investment. The effect of private 
investment on public investment and vice versa is established as a positive relationship. 
However, their results suggest that public investment is not influenced by expected output. 
Contractionary fiscal and monetary policies had a negative effect on public investment and a 
negative effect on private investment.  A study of the same nature as that of Malawi by Mataya 
and Veeman (1996) has not been done for the case of Zimbabwe and part of their study 
objectives have been adopted in this study. 
Of the literature cited, the impact of public investment in developing economies gives 
inconsistent results on whether it complements or crowds out private investment. Also, there is a 
fair share of the studies that suggests a direction of causality that runs from public investment to 
private investment, and also studies that support a two-way direction of causality between the 
                                                          
1
 For a discussion on their paper and some relayed developing country studies see Chhibber,A.,Dailami, M. and 
Shafik,N.(Editors)(1992). Reviving Private Investment in Developing Countries: Empirical Studies and Policy 
Lessons, North Holland, Washington DC 
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three types of investment. The literature review cited only three studies for Zimbabwe as very 
few studies have been conducted in Zimbabwe pertaining to the relationship between private 
investment and public investment.  
The Pattern of Investment in Zimbabwe 
From 1970, public investment was on an upward surge until 1975 were it reached an all time 
high of 10.6% of GDP during the pre-independence era. During this period, public investment 
averaged around 5 percent of GDP. This was well below the average recorded by private sector 
investment during the same period, of approximately 13.5 percent. However, it was 
acknowledged that public investment, ceteris paribus, was supportive of private sector 
investment through the creation and improvement in infrastructure, which was a necessary 
condition to economic development and growth in Zimbabwe. Throughout the 1970s, several 
major infrastructural developments were carried out. However, the liberation struggle played a 
significant part in lessening the extent to which these developments aided the private sector. Ever 
since 1976, public investment expenditure has been on a relatively downward trend(see figure I). 
However it surged in 1980 up until 1987 then it reverted to its downward spiral again. The 
increase in public investment for the period 1980 to 1987 can be attributed to the programmes 
embarked upon by the government. These involved the reconstruction of the economic 
infrastructure that had been destroyed during the war of liberation, the expansion of the 
education system and health services particularly in the rural areas. Primary school enrolment 
rose from 1.2 million in 1980 to 2.2 million in 1989, while enrolment in secondary school rose 
from 74,000 to 671,000 during the same period (Zwizwai,Kambudzi and Mauwa, 2004). In 1987 
public investment hit the below 5% levels and never recovered ever since. 
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Source: CSO, IMF, OECD, World Bank 
Figure I: Public Investment and Total Investment – Annual Percentage Change 1970 - 2007 
From 1991, public investment began to rapidly decrease haphazardly as can be evidenced by 
Figure I below. This may be attributed to the ESAP which had contractionary effects on public 
expenditure though it never mentioned explicitly if public investment was to be treated in the 
same manner as public expenditure. 
Changes in total investment are best mirrored by changes in private investment as can be 
deciphered by looking at Figure II. The share of public investment only surpassed that of private 
investment from 1983 to 1985. For the pre-independence period (1967-1980), private investment 
as a percent of GDP averaged around 12 percent. In the prescribed period private investment hit 
an all time low of around 7% only to gradually increase to 13.5% in 1981. Private investment 
performance worsened thereafter. During the period 1982 to 1990, private investment, as a ratio 
to GDP, averaged approximately 9 percent.  
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Source: CSO, IMF, OECD, World Bank 
Figure II: Private Investment and Total Investment – Annual Percentage Change  
The disturbing trend, in terms of the steady decline in private investment, which began in 1981 
and ended in 1990, resulted in a marked decline in overall investment. The slump in private 
sector investment since 1981 is a reflection of how the Zimbabwean economy has been affected 
by the uncertainties brought about by the socialist tendencies of the government. After the 
implementation of ESAP (in 1991) private investment levels surged upwards to above 15% of 
GDP only to retract from 1997 onwards (see Figure III). However, the trends on annual 
percentage changes in both private and total investment give a somewhat different prognosis 
(Figure II).Though the percentage contribution of private investment to GDP increased over the 
period 1991 to 1996, the rate of change has been steadily decreasing. The volatility of this 
decrease has been inflated since 1998. 
As the share of private investment increased in 1991, the share of public investment started to 
marginally decrease. Real GDP had been on an upward trend since 1970 only to retract in 1998 
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from whence it took a downward trend. This decline may be explained by the fall of the 
Zimbabwe dollar, uncertainty linked to the land reform exercise, the subsequently overvalued 
exchange rate and a plethora of other economic and social factors. 
The 1998 crisis (economic instability) changed the demand structure. From 2001 onwards, total 
investment expenditure declined substantially, as a result of the macroeconomic imbalances 
existing in the economy. In particular, private investment has been negative since 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSO, IMF, OECD, World Bank 
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Figure III: Percentage Contribution of Investment to GDP 1970 - 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CSO, IMF, OECD, World Bank 
Figure IV: Real GDP, Private Investment and Public Investment 
 
Methodology 
Use of the flexible accelerator model is made to come up with the regression model and 
additional factors that determine private and public investment are subsequently added in. After 
estimation of the models, the question of whether changes in private investment precede changes 
in public investment rather than as assumed in this study and in most studies, is addressed. This 
is done through the use of Granger Causality test. 
The idea in the formulation of the models to be estimated is that public and private investment 
follow the flexible accelerator hypothesis. The formulation is a variant of the neoclassical 
flexible accelerator model discussed by Ramirez, M.D (1994) and, Mataya, C.S and Veeman, 
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M.M (1996).The flexible accelerator model postulates that the desired capital stock *tK  is 
proportional to the level of expected output *tY . 
 
**
tYtK α= ………………………………..1 
where *tK  is the capital stock that the private sector desires to have in period t, and 
*
tY is 
the expected level of output in period t. 
The actual stock of private capital is assumed to adjust to the difference between the desired 
stock in period t and the actual stock in the previous period 1−t : 
   
)1*( −−=∆ tPItPItPI β ……………………….2 
Or    1
* )1(
−
−+= ttt PIPIPI ββ …………………3 
β - coefficient of adjustment where 10 ≥≤ β  
If β =1 then there is instantaneous adjustment of capital stock to its desired level 
otherwise if β =0 no adjustment takes place at all. 
tPI∆ -change in the actual private investment between 2 periods, that is, net private 
investment. 
In gross terms, the gross private investment (GPI) is given by 
   
*
1
**
−
+∆= ttt KKPI λ …………………….4 
That is change in the actual capital stock, *tK∆ , in a period plus replacement investment 
*
1−tKλ , 
where λ  is the rate of depreciation of the private capital stock. 
Since * 1
**
−
−=∆ ttt KKK then 
   
*
1
*
1
**
−−
+−= tttt KKKPI λ ………………..5 
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Using lag operator notation 
   [ ] ** )1(1 tt KLPI λ−−= …………………6 
 where L is the lag operator and is defined as, * 1
*
−
= tt KLK , inverting equation 5, we can 
relate the stock of private capital to the level of gross private investment 
  since )( 1* −−=∆ ttt PIPIPI β from 2 
   [ ] 11*)1(1 −− −=−−−=∆ ttttt PIPIPIKLPI λβ ………7 
   [ ] 1* )1()1(1 −−+−−= ttt PIKLPI βλβ ………………8 
Substituting for *tK  as given in equation 1 gives us 
   [ ] 1* )1()1(1 −−+−−= ttt PIYLPI βλαβ ……………..9 
Therefore, we can use equation 9 to specify desired gross private investment not only as a 
function of the desired level of real output but also of a number of variables such as the output 
gap, present and lagged values of public investment, dummy variables to deal with the 
qualitative factors of this study. This encompasses the dummy variables for SAP and the 
financial crisis which started in 1990 and 1998, respectively.  
Therefore, the equation to be estimated for the private investment equation will be:  
[ ] tt
n
i
ititttttt PIPUBzFCaSAPaGAPaYLPI εβββββλαβ +−+++++−−= −
=
−∑ 1
1
321
* )1()1(1  
This result is arrived at after substituting the extra variables in equation 6 and by substituting the 
resulting equation in equation 2 to get the above empirical model. 
To estimate the desired output *tY moving averages of the lagged values of real output will be 
used where the forecasted values of the regression are used as expected output. Furthermore, the 
level of depreciation for both private and public investment will be arbitrarily set as 10 percent.  
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Heller (1975) as quoted in Mataya and Veeman (1996) takes the approach to understanding the 
public investment as assuming that the behaviour of the public sector reflects the actions of a set 
of public decision makers giving the example of a Council of Ministers. Taking the stance that 
the public decision maker arrives at his decision taking the same steps as taken by the private 
investor(as above) with the exception of an allowance for autonomous investment we get the 
following model: 
[ ] tt
n
i
itittttt PUBPIhFCaSAPaGAPaYLPUB µβββββλαβρ +−+++++−−+= −
=
−∑ 1
1
321
* )1()1(1  
where  ρ is the autonomous public investment, β - coefficient of adjustment where 10 ≥≤ β , 
λ -is the rate of depreciation of the public capital stock , α -the optimal capital-output ratio or 
the accelerator coefficient, *tY -the desired output at time t will be estimated in the same way as 
stipulated in the private investment case above(moving averages), tSAP -dummy variable for the 
Structural adjustment program which is equal to 1 from 1990 to 1997 otherwise it is equal to 
zero, tFC -dummy variable for the economic instability (1998-crisis) which is equal to 1 from 
1998 to 2007 otherwise it is equal to zero, tPI -the level of private investment at time t, 1−tPUB -
the lag level of public investment, tµ  -is the white noise error term. 
The models to be estimated are then ,  
[ ] tt
n
i
ititttttt PIPUBzFCaSAPaGAPaYLPI εβββββλαβ +−+++++−−= −
=
−∑ 1
1
321
* )1()1(1  
[ ] tt
n
i
itittttt PUBPIhFCaSAPaGAPaYLPUB µβββββλαβρ +−+++++−−+= −
=
−∑ 1
1
321
* )1()1(1  
where tε and tµ are the error terms for the private investment and public investment equation 
respectively. Also, the general to specific method will be used to determine the appropriate 
number of lagged values of public investment and private investment that have significant effect 
on private and public investment, respectively. 
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Estimation and Analysis of Results 
In the first instance, the use of unit root tests is made so as to check the stationarity for our data. 
These were conducted using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The null hypothesis being 
tested is that the relevant series is not stationary against the alternative that the series is 
stationary. The test results of the variables is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table I : Unit Root Test Results    
VARIABLE  t- ADF  1% Critical 5% Critical 10% Critical LEVEL 
PI -1.681 -2.462 -1.699 -1.311 I(3)* 
PUB -1.809 -2.462 -1.699 -1.311 I(3)** 
GAP -4.343 -2.438 -1.690 -1.306 I(0)*** 
DC -1.725 -2.438 -1.690 -1.306 I(0)** 
***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
For there to be cointegration in a set of variables, all the variables included in a model should be 
integrated of the same order. Therefore, since private investment and public investment are 
integrated of the same order, this might signify the presence of cointegration in the variables and 
as such a cointegration test is employed.  
In addition, to assess the deterministic trends in the data, a summary of the cointegration tests 
under all five models in the Johansen methodology was used. The output displays the log 
likelihood and the information criteria under lag structure. 
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Table II: Information Criteria 
Lag LL LR Df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -272.433    57330.2 16.6323 16.6628 16.723 
1 -228.515 87.835 4 0.0000 5106.7 14.2137 14.3046 14.4851* 
2 -223.011 11.009 4 0.026 4678.87* 14.1219* 14.2744* 14.5753 
3 -220.653 4.7156 4 0.318 5211.98 14.2214 14.435 14.8563 
4 -215.933 9.439 4 0.051 5066.22 14.1778 14.4524 14.9941 
5 -210.015 9.8361* 4 0.043 4911.58 14.1221 14.4578 15.1198 
 
 
The study adopts the Schwartz’s Bayesian Information criterion (BIC) to the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). The main reason being that the AIC is biased towards selecting an over 
parameterised model and the BIC has superior large sample properties and is asymptotically 
consistent.  In using of these information criteria as a model selection guide, one should select 
the model with the smallest information criterion. From Table II above, the BIC is lowest at lag 
1. The next step is to check for cointegration. Johansen and Juselius (1990) developed two 
variants of the reduced rank tests for determining the cointegration space. According to the 
Johansen test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our model has one cointegration vector. 
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The presence of cointegration entails the use of an ECM to capture the effect of short run 
changes in our variables as they adjust to the long run model. In the long run private investment 
is cointegrated with public investment. 
The estimated VEC Model is given in Appendix 1. The VEC model shows that in the short run, 
private investment is best explained by itself, public investment and the stability of the 
economy.Public investment, on the other hand is dependant on private investment, the output 
gap, its past values and the stability of the economy. The Vector Error Correction Models gives 
an implication of private investment preceding public investment.  
One of the objectives of this study focused on the direction of causality between public 
investment and private investment. The table below gives these results for the period under 
study. 
Table III : Summary of Granger Causality Test 
Lags: 2 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
  PUB does not Granger Cause PI 37 1.65  0.2111 
  PI does not Granger Cause PUB 7.94  0.0019 
Lags: 3   
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
  PUB does not Granger Cause PI  1.16 0.3441 
  PI does not Granger Cause PUB 3.32  0.0367 
Lags: 4   
  Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
  PUB does not Granger Cause PI  0.88  0.4910 
  PI does not Granger Cause PUB  3.93 0.0156 
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For 2 lags, there is a 21.11% probability of accepting the null hypothesis of public investment 
granger causing private investment. This is a high enough probability to reject the alternative 
hypothesis.  Therefore, the conclusion is that public investment does not precede private 
investment for all lag specifications. The benchmark for probability-level assessments is the 10% 
level of significance. If the probability levels listed above are greater than 10% then we accept 
the null hypothesis otherwise we reject. For the alternative null hypothesis, the probability of 
rejection of the null hypothesis is high enough to conclude that private investment granger causes 
public investment. For example, for the case of 2 lags, the probability of rejection of the null 
hypothesis is 99.81%. Results show that over the whole period under study, 1970 to 2007, 
private investment granger causes public investment. In other words, private investment precedes 
public investment. 
The results conform with the predictions of the VECM, that is, the presence of unidirectional 
causality from private investment to public investment. There is a unidirectional causality which 
is not consistent with both theoretical and empirical literature and my expected results2.  
The Long Run Dynamics 
The Private Investment Model 
The estimation results of the long run private investment are given in the table 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 One would say it is not unusual given the long run relationship between our 2types of investment. A closer look 
at Figure 4 (under section one) would show that both public investment and private investment had diverging 
linear trends with the former not being comparatively volatile. 
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Table IV : Private Investment Model Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
PUB -0.8706088 0.5369627 -1.62 0.116
DC 0.0833284 0.0287733 2.90 0.007***
GAP 0.2126394 0.1489083 1.43 0.164
SAP 0.8258642 8.403473 0.10 0.922
FC -34.22387 9.842311 -3.38 0.002***
PI(-1) 0.7142927 0.12070726 5.92 0.0000***
PUB(-1) 1.209462 0.5964194 2.03 0.052*
PUB(-2) -1.017016 0.4796002 -2.12 0.043**
R-squared 0.8696     
Adjusted R-squared 0.8310 
  F-statistic   17.79221 
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Substituted Significant Coefficients: 
112 714.0209.122.34017.1286.0 PIPUBFCPUBDCPI t ++−−=   
 19 
Therefore Beta=0.28583, alpha=0.2915 
Except for public investment, all the variables in the long-run equation have the expected signs. 
Private investment appears to be responsive to desired capital. The coefficient of desired capital 
is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of confidence and it is large. This probably 
reflects how significant expected future demand has been to private investors. That even 
comparatively low expectations are significant in explaining the long-run trend suggests that 
high expectations of desired capital would be very important for increasing the rate of private 
investment.  
The economic instability of 1998 appears to be a significant deterrent to private investment. It 
increases the uncertainty of the environment in which private investors are operating and 
underlines the harm done by the vagueness of the government towards private investors.  
The previous year’s investment expenditure is an important determinant of the current year 
investment expenditure. About 29 percent of the difference between the desired capital in the 
current year and the actual capital investment in the previous year is corrected for in the current 
year. In other words, the adjustment coefficient Beta is predicted by the model to be 
approximately 0.284.  
The lagged values of public investment are significant in explaining private investment and 
appear to have differing effects on private investment in the long run. The one year lagged value 
is positively related while the two year lagged value is negatively related to private investment. 
This phenomenon may be explained by the ‘fire-fighting strategies5, followed by the government 
in dealing with the ever worsening economic climate in Zimbabwe. Since the advent of 
                                                          
3
 It is 0.286 of Desired Capital(DC) since 
*
tYDC α= , the value of beta is calculated from the coeffiecient of Private 
Investment (PI). 
4
 The actual stock of private capital in a single year is assumed to adjust to the difference between the desired 
stock in period t and the actual stock in the previous period 1−t . See section 3.1.1.  
5
 A term we use to explain the use of, mainly, monetary policy and monetary authorities in dealing with Zimbabwe’s 
economic woes. This is despite the fact that economic theory and practise has found monetary aggregates to be most 
effective when dealing with short run shocks to the economy. Also, the term takes into account the financing of most 
of the public investment through increased government domestic borrowing and the ever-increasing budget deficit. 
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economic instability in Zimbabwe, the government has been dealing with economic problems on 
an as-they-appear-basis. Higher lag public investment values were found to be insignificant 
hence the exclusion.  
What is, in many ways, most interesting about the long-run model is the variables that are not 
significant. The received wisdom about investment in Zimbabwe is that it is positively related to 
public investment with some degree of crowding out being postulated. However, the model 
shows a rather conflicting result6. The long run model tends to confirm the results of the VECM 
and the Granger causality tests, public investment does not plat any part in the determination of 
private investment expenditure. 
The dummy variable for ESAP gives us the expected sign, positive. However, its insignificance 
can be explained by the notion that ESAP mainly focused on government expenditure as a 
control variable. Private investment being taken as a spill over effect of the policy adopted. 
Therefore, ESAP might not have been directly related to private investment. The output gap 
(since it is insignificant) gives the implication that aggregate demand has an ambivalent effect on 
private investment. Since 1998, Zimbabwe has been in a recessionary gap, that is, positive output 
gap. The presence of a recessionary gap signals that the economy is in the depressed part of the 
trade cycle. Resources are either unemployed or, if employed are being underutilized. Many 
factories, and their employees, will be working short time, and many others will be fully 
unemployed (Lipsey and Chrystal, 1997). These circumstances can be taken to be true for the 
Zimbabwean case and have affected the significance of the output gap in determining private 
investment expenditures in the long run. 
 
                                                          
6
 Though significant, the coefficient of public investment is negative. This implies that public investment activities 
are actually detrimental to private investment. The extent of this negative effect we shall not focus on it since the 
coefficient of the variable might be overstated. Overstated through the inclusion of its lagged values. Excluding the 
lagged values confirms my fears, the coefficient of current period public investment decreases to 0.31 and is still 
negative and rather becomes insignificant. Also, the study results are similar to the empirical studies by Chhiber 
and Van Wijnbergen (1988) and Rossiter (2002) who report a negative effect of public investment on private 
investment (Ouattara, 2004). Also, Oshikoya (1994) found that for the case of Tanzania, public investment had a 
negative effect on private investment. 
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4.3 Public Investment Model 
For the long run public investment equation, results show comparatively a slightly different 
picture. Table 6 gives the results and the model statistics.   
Table V: Public Investment Model Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 5.77753 3.82712 1.51 0.143 
PI -0.03352 0.0530911 -0.63 0.533 
DC -0.0064006 0.0183273 -0.35 0.730 
GAP 0.0729478 0.0460368 158 0.125 
SAP -4.746233 2.350526 -2.02 0.053* 
FC -6.02682 3.082352 --1.96 0.061* 
PUB(-1) 0.6415888 0.1211405 5.30 0.0000*** 
PI(-1) 0.2162538 0.0565622 3.82 0.001*** 
PI(-2) -0.1113825 0.0528704 -2.11 0.045** 
R-squared 0.8677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8286 
F-statistic 16.62695    
  Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000   
***, ** and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
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Substituted Significant Coefficients: 
tttt PUBPIPIFCSAPPUB 121 642.0111.0216.0027.6746.4 +−+−−=  
Public investment like private investment is explained by the first two lagged values of private 
investment. Also, the relationship between current year public and private investment is still 
insignificant and relative positive. As expected, ESAP and the unstable economic conditions 
starting 1998 had a negative effect on public investment expenditure. From 1998 onwards, public 
investment expenditure decreased at a higher level as compared to the ESAP period. The output 
gap is insignificant as an explanatory variables of public investment behaviour. Also, desired 
capital is definitely ruled out as an explanatory variable.  
Conclusion  
The study principally investigated the relationship between private investment and public 
investment with an assessment of the effect of the ESAP and unstable economic environment of 
1998. The results from the unit root tests indicated that that the variables were integrated of the 
same order. Cointegration tests indicated one cointegrating equation, therefore, the use of a 
VECM model. The results from the VECM suggest that, in the short run, private investment is 
best explained by its lagged values while public investment is best explained by its lagged values 
and private investment to a particular extent. The flexible accelerator model was employed for 
both the private and public investment models. In the long run, macroeconomic instability was 
found to have inhibited both private and public investment. ESAP had a negative effect on public 
investment. However, the results from the Pairwise Granger Causality tests suggest that private 
investment granger causes public investment. These results do not entirely conform to the 
hypothesis of the study. The main reasons for this that can be raised are the rather abnormal 
conditions that existed in Zimbabwe during and after the economic instability. Also since these 
two types of investment are explained by other factors other themselves, the unexpected results 
act as a confirmation of this finding. 
Given the irreversible nature of investment, private investors are reluctant to commit large sums 
of money on fixed investment when there is widespread uncertainty in the social and economic 
environment of Zimbabwe (as noticed by the negative effect economic instability had on private 
investment). Therefore, the government of Zimbabwe should aim to improve the existent 
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economic environment through better and increased credibility in policy formulation and 
implementation. High inflation rates are an open indicator of macroeconomic instability, which 
has been proven to have adverse effects on investment. The hyperinflation in Zimbabwe 
increased the risk-ness of longer-time sustainable investment. 
More of public expenditure has been current in nature and more of the public investment 
expenditure was in replacement investment. This particular trend must be broken if Zimbabwe is 
to foster economic growth through increased private investment. At least a positive net 
investment should be achieved by the government. In addition, Granger causality tests showed 
private investment preceding public investment which shows that the government is not in 
control. The government needs to bring a turn around to this relationship if it will be in control of 
the economic future of Zimbabwe. It also needs to make these two types of investment 
complements rather than substitutes given the state of the economy at the moment. ESAP was a 
success in reducing public investment expenditure but there is need to formulate and implement 
policies which focus entirely on both types of investment. The formulation and implementation 
of policies which assume a particular relationship between particular economic variables without 
plausible econometric or mathematical backup should be avoided.  
However, should the government have continued to reduce the public investment expenditure 
during the ESAP era? I do not think so. As can be evidenced by this study and particular studies 
in industrial economics, below minimal public investment expenditure may have played a 
significant part as a deterrent to private investment in Zimbabwe7. For example, Fafchamps et 
al., (1998) gives an example of how manufacturing firms in Zimbabwe need to hold high levels 
of inventories due to unreliable delivery of inputs tied to poor transportation infrastructure.  
Hence government needs to play a facilitator role as a provider of most of the public services that 
private investors need. The study results show that public investment ended up being preceded 
by private investment.  
                                                          
7
 For other African studies see Pradhan (1996), for the case of Uganda see Reinikka and Svensson (1998), for 
Nigeria see Lee and Anas (1991). These studies give the notion that developing countries have had below minimal 
levels of public investment expenditure. 
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However, the study cannot break away from the conclusion that, until the fiscal and the monetary 
authorities are also encouraged to formulate policies that foster macroeconomic stability, the 
look for a sustainable surge in private investment will not materialize.  
This study has shown some of the potential of fiscal policy as a tool for achieving other goals 
other than the restoration of macroeconomic balance. In particular, the specification and testing 
of the impact of public policy on private investment needs careful study. The eclectic approach 
of this study, which applies theory to the mechanisms prevalent in Zimbabwe, shows promise for 
elucidating the role of public policy in influencing private investment.  
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APPENDIX  
Estimated Vector Error Correction Model 
 Coef  Std. error Z P(z) 
D_PI     
Ce1 -0.847648 0.0357963 -2.37 0.018 
LD_PI -0.3142891 0.1706266 -1.84 0.065 
LD_PUB 0.9249344 0.5269514 1.76 0.079 
SAP -0.9209692 7.991809 -0.12 0.908 
FC -27.7031 9.995586 -2.77 0.006 
GAP 0.0829308 0.1590216 0.52 0.602 
MGDP 0.0485575 0.0556485 0.87 0.383 
Constant 0.0881653 11.38983 0.01 0.994 
D_PUB     
Ce1 -0.0195533 0.010683 -1.83 0.067 
LD_PI 0.181262 0.0509216 3.56 0.0000 
LD_PUB 0.1026899 0.1572628 0.65 0.514 
SAP -3.34407 2.385067 -1.40 0.161 
FC -6.422671 2.983072 -2.15 0.031 
GAP 0.103962 0.0474582 2.19 0.028 
MGDP 0.0159715 0.0166077 0.96 0.336 
Constant -0.3822026 3.39917 -0.11 0.910 
 
 
